This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies …nanced by public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is …nanced by a tax and/or public debt. We show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low, the economy is relegated to an environmental-poverty trap. We also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady state. In particular, we …nd that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long-run steady state.
Introduction
Environmental protection programs are often constrained by long-term …scal objectives which impose to control public de…cits and public debt evolution.
These long-term constraints have signi…cant consequences for developing countries. The search for …nancing mechanisms that do not increase debt burden has renewed interest in debt-for-nature swaps.
1 Therefore, debtor countries reduce their debt burden, and free up budgetary resources for environmental spending.
In 1991, the Paris Club 2 introduced a clause that allowed members to convert all o¢ cial public debt through debt swaps with social or environmental objectives (Jha and Schatan, 2001; Ruiz, 2007) . This led to a marked increase in debt-for-nature initiatives. Canada, Finland, France, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States were the …rst countries to make use of the Paris Club clause in the environmental sphere (see Moye, 2003) . Finally, debt swaps were part of the negotiating text for the Copenhagen summit.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the economic consequences of such …scal instrument. More precisely, we study the environmental policy under a debt stabilization constraint, when public actions to protect the environment are at least partially …nanced by public funds. Could public debt be a solution 3 for the 1 In such swaps a non-governmental organisation (NGO) purchases developing country debt on the secondary market at a discount from the face value of the debt title. The NGO redeems the acquired title with the debtor country in exchange for a domestic currency instrument used to …nance environmental expenditures (see Hansen, 1989; Jha and Schatan, 2001; Sheikh, 2008) . The …rst agreement was signed between Conservation International and Bolivia in 1987.
More recently, such a bilateral deal was signed between the United States and Indonesia, swapping nearly US$ 30 million of Indonesian government debt owed to the United States over the next eight years against Indonesia's commitment to spend this sum on NGO projects bene…ting Sumatra's tropical forests (see Cassimon et al., 2009) .
2 Paris Club is a forum for negotiating debt restructurings between indebted developing countries and o¢ cial bilateral creditors.
…nancing of environmental policies? In other words, is it possible and bene…cial for all to substitute a …nancial burden to an environmental burden?
We consider an overlapping generations model à la Diamond (1965) with an environmental intergenerational externality. Indeed, longevity is increasing in environmental quality. We assume that public environment maintenance expenditure could be …nanced by issuing public debt. Moreover, a debt stabilizing constraint imposes a constant level of debt per capita.
By using this framework, we show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is too low, the economy is relegated to an environmental-poverty trap. In opposition to many papers (John and Pecchenino, 1994; John et al., 1995; Mariani et al., 2010) , we …nd that the economy may be characterized by a con ‡ict between environmental quality and capital accumulation. Increasing debt and/or public spending reduces the capital stock at the long-run stable steady state, but improves environmental quality. Finally, we show that when the government decreases debt and increases environmental protection spending (the debt-for-nature swaps solution), it may improve capital accumulation and environmental quality at the long-run steady state, toward which the economy converges if the initial conditions are not too low.
Moreover, such a policy is welfare improving.
Previous papers have analyzed the consequences of environmental policies on environmental quality, growth and welfare (Howarth and Norgaard, 1992; John and Pecchenino, 1994; John et al., 1995; Jouvet et al., 2000) . Nevertheless, in all these studies, government cannot fund pollution abatement programs by issuing public debt. However, debt …nancing has already been introduced in dynamic models with environmental concerns (Bovenberg and Heijdra 1998; Heijdra et al. 2006) , but these contributions focus on a di¤erent issue than ours. Instead of using debt to …nance a share of pollution abatement, debt policy makes possible to redistribute welfare gains from future to existing generations. In our model, the role of the public debt is twofold: as usual, it redistributes welfare among existing and future generations, but …rst of all, it …nances the public pollution abatement sector. 4 Hence, the redistribution properties of the public debt are limited by the environmental engagement of the government.
Finally, in our paper, we also take into account the impact of environmental quality on health and life expectancy (see for instance, Figure  5 1 ). This assumption is justi…ed by the results of an increasing number of empirical studies measuring the health e¤ects of pollution (OECD, 2008) . These relationships are nowadays well-documented and are probably the most striking features of the negative impact of pollution on individuals. Recently, Kampa and Castanas (2008) and Neuberg et al. (2007) con…rm that exposures to air pollutants are linked to reduced life expectancy. The relation between longevity and the environment is studied by Pautrel (2008) , Jouvet et al. (2010) , Mariani et al. (2010) and Varvarigos (2010) . In these articles, the economy faces a trade-o¤ between …nancing education and health programs or environmental protection programs. But, once again, they do not consider the possibility for governments to …ght environmental degradation by issuing public debt.
In the next section, we present the model. The intertemporal equilibrium is de…ned in Section 3. The fourth section looks at the steady-states, while
Section 5 is devoted to dynamics analysis. Finally, Section 6 presents the comparative statics. The last section concludes. Technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
We consider an overlapping generations model with discrete time, t = 0; 1; :::; +1, and three types of agents: consumers, …rms and a government.
Consumers
Consumers live for two periods. The size of the generation born at period t is N t .
Each person will have n > 1 children during his youth. Hence, the generation born at the next period will have a size N t+1 = nN t . When old, each one has a longevity (e t ) 2 ( ; 1), with 1 > > 0, 0 < 0 (e t ) < B and B > 0 …nite.
In the following, E t denotes aggregate environmental quality 6 at period t and,
following John et al. (1995) , we consider that e t E t =N t corresponds to a measure of per capita environmental quality in period t. We assume that the longevity of an old living at period t + 1 positively depends on this index of environmental quality faced by the household during his youth.
Preferences of an household born at period t are represented by a log-linear utility function (W t ) de…ned over consumption when young c t and old d t+1 , which depends on the longevity (e t ):
where > 0 is a scaling parameter, arbitrarily close to zero. This parameter ensures that, for every interior solution, the welfare is increasing in e t , given c t and d t+1 .
At the …rst period of life, an household born at period t supplies inelastically one unit of labor, remunerated at the competitive real wage w t , and pays taxes
Firms
Since each young consumer supplies inelastically one unit of labor, labor used in production at period t is N t . Then, the production is given by
where k t = K t =N t denotes the capital-labor ratio. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology, we further have f (k t ) = k s t , with s 2 (0; 1) the capital share in total income. From pro…t maximization, we get:
Environmental quality
In this economy, we consider that production degrades environmental quality, while public spending, i.e. public environmental abatement, G t 0 improves it. Assuming linear relationships, environmental quality follows the motion:
where > 0 represents the rate of pollution coming from …rms' activities, > 0 the e¢ ciency of public abatement, and m 2 (0; 1); is interpreted as a rate of natural degradation in the quality of the environment. This exogenous rate of degradation represents the speed of return of the environment at a level incompatible with human activities.
Public sector
The aim of the government is to improve environmental quality, using public spending G t to provide pollution abatement and environmental protection programs. To …nance these expenditure, as seen above, the government levies taxes t 0, or can use debt B t . This means that a share of present pollution abatement is …nanced by future generations, assuming hence that generations who will bene…t from the public environmental protection should pay for it. This 8 assumption corresponds to a bene…ciary-payer principle, enhancing the willingness to implement the environmental policy. Indeed, one of the results of the literature is to show that environmental taxation implies such a welfare loss for present generations that its implementation cannot be wished: one of the generations that would decide it would also bear the heaviest burden. In our model, the living generations should more easily accept public pollution abatement if a share of these activities are …nanced through public debt, instead of taxes on revenues or consumptions.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the government can be written:
with B 1 0 given.
Intertemporal equilibrium
We de…ne the following variables per worker, b t 1 B t 1 =N t and g t G t =N t .
Equilibrium on the asset market is ensured by:
where the individual saving t is given by (4). Moreover, the budget constraint of the government (8) can be rewritten:
and the law of motion of environmental quality becomes:
In order to avoid explosive public expenditure and debt, we assume that debt per worker b t = b and public expenditure per worker g t = g are constant.
This also means that debt B t and government spending G t grow both at the rate n 1. In this case, equation (10) determines the level of the tax faced by each young consumer:
Therefore, an intertemporal equilibrium can be de…ned as follows:
De…nition 1 Given e 0 2 R and k 0 2 R ++ , an intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence (e t ; k t ) 2 R R ++ , t = 0; 1; :::; +1, such that the following equations are satis…ed:
We notice that the dynamics are driven by a two-dimensional dynamic system, with two predetermined variables.
Steady states
A steady state is a solution (e; k) 2 R R ++ that solves:
In the limit case without government intervention, i.e. b = g = 0, we have:
with (k) = k s =(n 1+m). We deduce that there is one steady state (k 1 ; e 1 ) with k 1 = 0 and e 1 = 0, and a second one (k 2 ; e 2 ) such that:
with k 2 > 0 and e 2 = k s 2 =(n 1 + m) < 0. We notice that since the left-hand side of (19) is increasing in k 2 and the right-hand side is decreasing, the solution (k 2 ; e 2 ) is unique. We further have 8 :
Obviously, inequality (20) (inequality (21)) holds in a neighborhood of k 1 (k 2 ).
Therefore, di¤erentiating (16), dk=db > 0 (dk=db < 0) for k su¢ ciently close to
. Moreover, we can show that if
dk=dg > 0 (dk=dg < 0) for k su¢ ciently close to k 1 (k 2 ). Notice that Assumption 1 is satis…ed if the longevity is not too sensitive to the environmental index e.
We deduce that:
Proposition 1 There exists two steady states (k 1 ; e 1 ) and (k 2 ; e 2 ), with positive capital-labor ratio 0 < k 1 < k 2 and e 1 > e 2 , if b > 0 and/or, under Assumption 1, g > 0, taking into account that b and g are not too large.
Dynamics
As it is summarized in Proposition 1, two steady states with positive production may coexist. Using a phase diagram, we now qualitatively analyze the dynamics.
This allows us to have a picture about convergence. Does it exist a poverty trap for a set of initial conditions (k 0 ; e 0 )? What are the conditions to converge to the steady state with the largest capital-labor ratio? What is the role of the policy parameters b and g?
8 Indeed, we have ' 0 (k) = (1 s)sk s 1 and 0 (k) = n(1 + (e))= (e) + [ 0 (e)= (e) 2 ]n sk s =(n 1 + m).
Using (13), we immediately see that e t+1 > e t if and only if e t 6 (k t ), where (k) is given by (15). Hence, the locus such that e t is stationary describes a negatively slopped curve in the space (k t ; e t ). Below this curve, e t is increasing, whereas above it, e t is decreasing (see also Figure 2 ).
Using (14), we deduce that k t+1 > k t is equivalent to (e t ) 6 (k t ), with
Since (e t ) is increasing, (e t ) is decreasing, with (e t ) > 2. However, we observe that there exists a solution to the equation
meaning that this still holds if b > 0 and g > 0 are not too large. In this case,
Using (23), we get:
with
Since h 0 (k) > 0, h(0) = 1 and h(+1) = +1, there exists a unique k
Since (e) is decreasing, we deduce that the locus e t = (k t )
is U-shaped in the space (k t ; e t ). Moreover, above this curve, k t is increasing, while below it, k t is decreasing (see Fig. 2 ).
Using all these results, the dynamics are determined as in Figure 2 . Obviously the two points, where the curves (k t ) and (k t ) cross, correspond to the two steady states (k 1 ; e 1 ) and (k 2 ; e 2 ).
This analysis allows to have a global picture of the dynamics. Recalling that both k t and e t are predetermined variables, the steady state (k 2 ; e 2 ) is stable, while the other one (k 1 ; e 1 ) is an unstable saddle. This means that starting with initial conditions, such that the capital-labor ratio is not too low, the economy converges to the steady state with the higher capital stock. In contrast, the existence of the saddle with k 1 > 0 implies that there is a poverty trap. Indeed, if the initial capital stock is too small, capital decreases and the economy can never reach the steady state (k 2 ; e 2 ). In opposition to many papers (e.g. John and Pecchenino, 1994; John et al., 1995; Mariani et al., 2010) , we show that a con ‡ict between environmental quality and capital accumulation may exist. This is because we do not consider private engagement in pollution abatement, pollution is hence a pure externality for households. This con ‡ict seems quite realistic as it squares with the increasing part of the Environmental Kuznets
Curves, which corresponds to many developing countries (see Figures  9 3 and 4) or to some global pollutants, like CO2 emissions.
9 For details, see Figure 1 , page 5. As seen in Section 4, increasing b and/or g raises k 1 , taking into account that both b and g are not too large. Therefore, this widens the range of initial conditions (k 0 ; e 0 ) such that the economy is relegated into the poverty trap.
To understand the occurrence of the poverty trap, assume …rst that there is no debt (b = 0), i.e. public expenditure is …nanced by taxation ( t = g > 0).
In this case, if the capital stock is too low, the wage is quite small, implying that the disposable income is not large enough to sustain capital accumulation.
However, this may be mitigated by a larger longevity, which improves savings.
Therefore, a higher initial environmental quality makes the emergence of the trap harder.
A closely related intuition explains why debt promotes the existence of the trap. The main e¤ect comes from the fact that in the presence of a positive debt, a share of saving is devoted to buy unproductive assets (b). Therefore, if the initial capital stock is again too low, the disposable income of young households
is not large enough to sustain the growth of the capital stock.
Comparative statics
We analyze comparative statics to clearly see the e¤ects of government intervention, through b and g, on the levels of capital and environment per worker at the two steady states. Why is it relevant to study comparative statics at the two steady states? On one hand, (k 2 ; e 2 ) is stable and an economy converges to this equilibrium in the long run as long as its initial conditions are not too low.
On the other hand, (k 1 ; e 1 ) marks, in a sense, the boundary of the trap.
The two-dimension system that de…nes the steady state solutions writes (see equations (13) and (14)):
15
Total di¤erentiation of equations (26) and (27) yields:
The determinant of A is positive (negative) when it is evaluated at the steady state with low capital (k 1 ; e 1 ) (high capital (k 2 ; e 2 )).
Proof. See the Appendix A.
System (28) writes:
We further assume:
Assumption 2 is low enough, i.e. satis…es the following inequality, evaluated at the two steady states (k 1 ; e 1 ) and (k 2 ; e 2 ):
We note that a low is also in accordance with Assumption 1. Assumption 2 ensures that + (e) is strictly positive, while Assumption 1 imposes + (e) > 0.
We deduce the total consequences of variations of public debt or of public abatement, as summarized in the following proposition and in and/or an increase in public abatement per capita g will increase (decrease) the capital stock and increase (decrease) the environmental quality at the steady state with low capital (k 1 ; e 1 ) (high capital (k 2 ; e 2 )).
In other words, a higher debt and/or public abatement reduces capital but improves environmental quality at the stable steady state. Opposite e¤ects are observed for the unstable saddle steady state. This means that the range of initial conditions (k 0 ; e 0 ), such that the economy is relegated to a trap, becomes larger.
The mechanisms underlying these results are quite intuitive. Let us focus on the steady state (k 2 ; e 2 ) as it is the stable one. Any increase of the public debt (db > 0) will induce a crowding-out e¤ect on capital accumulation, private saving will support the …nancing of the public debt instead of the private investment. Doing so, the capital stock decreases and production of goods decreases too. This turns to a fall in pollutant emissions which enhances environmental quality. On the other hand, any increase of public engagement (dg > 0), ceteris paribus, will require a higher tax rate, that will also slow down the economic activity.
Still focusing on the stable steady state (k 2 ; e 2 ), we study whether the government intervention, summarized by the two instruments b and g, can improve both capital accumulation and environmental quality. In order to conciliate higher environmental quality with capital accumulation evolution, we show that government should decrease debt and increase environmental protection programs (as in the debt-for-nature swaps solution).
Using the di¤erentiation of the steady state with respect to b and g, at the equilibrium (k 2 ; e 2 ) where detA < 0, dk > 0 and de > 0 are equivalent to:
db < G 1 dg and db > G 2 dg with
We may easily see that because detA < 0, we have G 2 < G 1 < 0. This allows us to deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satis…ed. At the stable steady state (k 2 ; e 2 ), both capital and environmental quality increase (dk > 0, de > 0) if and only if government spending increases (dg > 0) and debt reduces (db < 0), according to:
The main intuition of this result is the following. A higher public spending improves environmental quality through public abatement. It also reduces capital accumulation because of a higher level of taxation. To ensure a higher level of capital, a lower debt is required to reduce its crowding out e¤ect and promote capital accumulation.
The welfare analysis shows that households' welfare evaluated at a steady state is increasing in the environmental quality only (see the Appendix B). This provides an adding argument in favor of the policy investigated in Proposition 3.
Regarding the set of 32 developing countries, a closer look to the data, with help of results of Proposition 3, shows that Uruguay, Brazil, Botswana, Turkey, Panama, Malaysia, Gabon, Venezuela, Lebanon and Mexico would bene…t from environmental policies based on debt-for-nature swaps mechanism. Conversely, Ukraine, Philippines, Paraguay, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Syria, Morocco, Macedonia and El Salvador should probably postpone environmental policies in the short term, and concentrate on economic growth. Otherwise, these economies may converge toward a poverty trap.
Conclusion
Among several countries, non explosive public debt is a major constraint. Nevertheless, the growing concerns about the environmental degradation (biodiversity losses, climate change...) lead many governments to …ght against pollution and hence, to increase environmental spending. In many countries, the pollution mitigation induces the adoption of environmental taxes bearing on households, alongside with the increase of the individual environmental engagements.
In this paper, public abatement is not only …nanced by taxation, but also by debt emission. We show that, under a stabilizing debt constraint, the environmental public policy may lead the economy to a poverty-environmental trap. Indeed, with a higher level of public debt, the stabilization of the latter reduces households'share of income devoted to productive saving. This result is reinforced by a larger public spending.
This allows us to recommend that policy-makers should carefully evaluate the level of public debt before increasing their environmental engagement. Finally, for developing countries that are converging towards a higher capital stock equilibrium, debt-for-nature swaps could be a win-win solution. Remember that the two steady states (k 1 ; e 1 ) and (k 2 ; e 2 ) are such that:
where '(k) and (k) are de…ned in equation (16) One may easily see that this expression is equivalent to:
We deduce that detA > 0 when the matrix A is evaluated at the steady state (k 1 ; e 1 ), while detA < 0 when the matrix A is evaluated at the steady state (k 2 ; e 2 ).
